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An era characterized by bigness--big budgets, big business, big govern-
ment, big explosions--of population, information, and technology--provides, an 
environment hospitable to the growth and development of the big, total ap-
proach. Such is systems analysis, with its components and companions, cost/ 
effectiveness measures and program planning/budgeting. These methods, utilized 
and refined in military and space missions, have gained favor for the apparent 
tidiness with which they have achieved management marvels. For this and other 
reasons to be mentioned later, systems analysis has come to be accepted as a 
nostrum for all manner of social ailments, and the market for socio-economic 
systems is booming. At present receiving one dollar out of every five in the 
U. S. Budget, socio-economic programs, by 1975, will account for one or per-
haps two out of every four dollars. With the federal investment in urban 
renewal for 1968-78 amounting to $250 billion, predictions that the market 
for urban civil systems will reach somewhere between $210 and $298 billion by 
1980 may prove accurate.1 
The prospect of so bountiful a market is enticing, and prospectors 
of remarkable diversity as to discipline, background, and competence are con-
verging on it. There are aerospace and aviation firms, computer manufacturers 
and their multifarious subsidiaries, electronics companies, management con-
sultants, appliance makers, directory publishers, and university-based entre-
preneurs. Prominent among the contenders for contracts are the nonprofit but 
highly profitable "think tanks," with their inhouse experts and on tap con-
sultants and their proliferating satellites with unpronounceable acronyms. 
They are all competing energetically to bring what journalists enthusiasti-
cally hail as "the powerful tools of technology" to bear on matters concerning 
the commonweal. 
1 Finance Magazine, January 1968. Staff, V-P. Marketing, North American 
Aviation, The Economic Business Spectrum as Related to National Goals-- 
Identification of New Business Opportunities, 1967.
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The forensic, oft repeated, is familiar. Senator Gaylord Nelson summed 
it up in a nutshell: "... why can not the same specialist who can figure out 
a way to put a man in space figure out a way to keep him out of jail? Why 
can not the engineers who can move a rocket to Mars figure out a way to move 
people through our streets and across the country without the horrors of 
modern traffic and the concrete desert of our highway system? Why can not 
the scientists who can cleanse instruments to spend germ-free years in space 
devise a method to end the present pollution of air and water here on earth? 
Why can not highly trained manpowec which can calculate a way to transmit 
pictures for millions of miles in space, also show us a way to transmit 
enough simple information to keep track of our criminals? The answer is we 
can--if we have the wit to apply our scientific know-how to the analysis and 
solution of social problems with the same creativity we have applied to space 
problems."2 
This type of argument is persuasive on several counts: first, the 
prestigious origin and logical, scientific aura of systems analysis, and 
second, the growing recognition of the need for better planning, organization, 
and management of social affairs. A brief re/i.i of the genealogy and current 
conception of the systems approach will adequately illustrate the first point. 
Dr. Charles J. Hitch, 3 whose imprint on this methodology is so great that it 
is sometimes called "Hitchcraft," described systems analysts as a direct 
lineal descendant of World War II operational research. O.R. was used to 
solve tactical and strategic problems of a military nature; systems analysis 
uses the same principles but has wider range and scope. It encompasses (1) 
2 Statement by Senator Gaylord P. Nelson, Congressional Record. Proceedings 
and Debates of the 89th Congress, First Session, October 18, 1965, No. 1914. 
3 Charles J. Hitch, Royal Society Nuffield Lecture, London, October 25, 1966.
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a more distant future environment, (2) more interdependent variables, (3) 
greater uncertainties, (14) less obvious objectives and rules of choice. 
Impressive as to historical background, systems analysis,' with its heavy 
reliance on models and mathematical computations and manipulations, has 
special appeal in an era characterized by a universal craving for certainty 
and orderliness. 
This yearning underlies the present impatience with traditional ap-
proaches. Juxtaposing the duplication, confusion, and disarray of current 
public administration with the rationality and neatness of program management 
to be realized from application of the "revolutionary concepts," proponents 
of systems analysis make a strong case for their wares. And there is no 
gainsaying the fact that social problems beset us: urban blight deepens and 
spreads; pollution of air, water, and land proceed at an awesome pace; crne 
rates soar; arteries and facilities for air and ground travel are dangerously 
clogged. In one way or another, these problems ultimately become the business 
of government, already regarded by many as too big to be potent and too trapped 
in a bureaucratic maze to respond effectively. 
In California, the now-famous four aerospace contracts for systems 
studies can be attributed substantially and generally but not exclusively 
and particularly to the above-mentioned reasons. Here, political and economic 
considerations played a crucial role, for the year was 1964, and Edm U nd G. 
Brown, in the middle of a battle for re-election, wanted to bolster the 
state's economy and his own image. Anticipating a cutback in defense and 
aerospace employrieit, he launched his experiment as a means for diversification 
of product and redeployment of talent, as well as for improving governance. 
Although he was unseated, the California experience has been apotheosized. 
14
This comparison was made by Albert Wohlstetter in "Scientiests, Seers, and 
Strategy,'' Columbia University, Council for Atomic Age Studies, 1962, 
pp 36-7 (unpublished paper).
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The strategy has won favor from county to Congress. For public officials want-
ing to improve their ways and ambitious problem-solvers wishing to augment 
their means, systems analysis has proved to be a promising vehicle on the 
high road to grants and contracts. 
Can we assume from the vast expenditure of public funds and mobilization 
of motley systems experts that we will now witness a diminution of the in-
-efficiency, ineptness, and uncertainty that plague planners of public programs?--
The question is important; it is one about which the California and subsequent 
experiences have produced more caveats than conclusions. And, interesting to 
note, these caveats stem from many of the same factors that fostered the 
introduction of systems analysis into the social arena. 
As you may recall, I mentioned four: historical antecedents, scientific 
attributes, and political and economic circumstances. Just as association 
with defense and space achievements endowed systems analysis with an enviable 
escutcheon, it also blunted the critical evaluation to which some other, less 
distinguished, methodology might have been subjected. To judge from recent 
discussion, 5
 the DOD model may not be optimal for military, let alone other 
kinds.of, decisions. The circumstances governing and criteria for judging 
effectiveness in defense and aerospace missions bear little resemblance to 
those prevailing in other orders of social accounting. Nevertheless, accept-
ance of the methodology spreads unchecked, and carried over into the civil 
sphere are the same assumptions, rules, and courses of action that appeared 
so logical and scientific in their earlier context. 
First and foremost, there is the assumption that by virtue of a semantic 
impoverishment that allows us to use the word system for everything from atomic 
5James R. Schlesinger, Systems Analysis and the Political Process, RAND Paper 
P-3464, June, 1967, pp 14 ff. See also Hearings before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 90th Congress, Second Session, Part 2, May 28, 
1968.
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weapons delivery to anthropotomy, the same analytic tools can aid in under-
standing all of them and the same remedies can be applied to their mal-
functioning. There is the related assumption that since large scale, complex 
systems have been "managed" by use of certain techniques, then social systems, 
which are often large and always complex, can be "managed" in like fashion. 
This presupposes similarity of structure, with social systems reducible to 
measurable, controllable components, all of whose relationships are fully 
recognized, appreciated, and amenable to manipulation. The very character-
istics which distinguish social from other species of systems render them 
resistant to treatment that tries to force them into analytically tractable 
shape.
(1) They defy definition as to objective, philosophy, and scope. What 
kind of definition of a welfare system can be regarded as valid--that which 
encompasses the shortcomings of other systems, such as health, education, 
employment, or the one which focuses on individual inadequacy? A definition 
of welfare as an entity without explicit reference to and perturbation of 
other systems of society would be meaningless. Moreover, the definition 
depends on the point of view and the ideological posture. The system looks 
very different to the administrator, the recipient, the Black Power monger, 
the social critic, and the politician. 
(2) "Solution" of social problems is never achieved. You do not "solve" 
the problems of health or transportation. Consequently, where you start and 
where you stop is purely arbitrary, and usually a reflection of the amount 
of money the government has to fund the particular analysis. 
(3) Despite the semblance of precision, there are no right or wrong, 
true or false solutions. Consequently, it is presumptuous to label as wrong 
anything being done now and right that which looks good on paper. By
N 
concentrating on miniscule portions or isolated variables simply because they 
are quantifiable, the technique may actually lead to results which are irrele-
vant and inappropriate. Social costs and social benefits can never be calcu-
lated by a computer, and even dollar cost/benefit comparison is a matter of 
interpretation. There are no ground rules for identifying the Peter being 
robbed and the Paul getting paid. 
Corollary to the assumption that systems analysis can improve the state 
of the art of public program planning is the notion that the "systems expert" 
is a past master of advanced concepts on all fronts. He ascribes to himself 
a clairvoyance denied specialists in the subject area, for, with the greatest 
of ease, he hurdles 1984 and designs year 2000 plans. As though his own 
original discovery, he brands present practices as fragmentary and duplicatory. 
This situation he corrects by an unfurling of flip charts, a dubbing of labels 
in blank boxes, a;'d an affixing of arrows on the flow diagrams. He deplores 
the lack of information and proposes a data bank to capture every last bit. 
After an exercise in present-day serendipity now known as "playing around 
with some models" and a series of optimistically-called "progress reports," 
time and money will have run out. The air may be no safer to breathe, urban 
ills no less crucial, but conclusions and recommendations, like campaign 
speeches, will ring with truisms and promises. (1) Present planning is 
wasteful and ineffective; (2) the prescribed course of action is more systems-
studies which will harness huge reservoirs of talent and put to use the 
"powerful tools of technology" and produce knowledge and understanding. 
Anyone who has reviewed systems reports cannot fail to recognize the 
pervasiveness of the "Perils of Pauline" feature. It begins to appear that 
this phenomenon is intrinsic to the nature of the technique. One cannot but 
wonder why the fountain of knowledge and understanding waited until the experts
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had vacated their high government posts and founded or joined think tanks 
before they started gushing. Accorded a carte blanche never permitted pro-
fessionals grappling with the real-life problems, the experts approach problems 
without regard to jurisdictional boundaries and constraints and in a timespan 
that plays leapfrog into the next ceniury with but scant regard for the inter-
vening years. It should be noted that anyone can join the popular sport of 
knocking bureaucracy, and playing utopian games is easy. Systems experts 
justify their activities by the former and proceed blithely to the latter. 
If this hard look has fallen on the technicians as much as the technique, 
it is necessarily so, for the two are inextricably intertwined. What the 
analyst conceives as the system is reflected in its definition, its objectives, 
its interfaces, its significant variables, its relevant data. The methodology 
of systems analysis supplies the form; the analyst, the content. The inputs 
which he selects become determinative. That he chooses to omit certain phe-
nomena because of his own biasor because they resist quantitative treatment 
may be far more crucial to society than his model, but neither the technique 
nor the technician has use for them. Especially impatient with the incalcul-
able aspects and implications are the systems experts whose background is in 
engineering andhose assumptions about talent transferability and competence 
in social matters are exceeded only by their presumptions. To judge by their 
performance, I suspect that many of them became "social engineers" because of 
expendability in their own line; F know that they made capital out of any 
exposure, however brief, to the social •sciences. Like the Puritan who marched 
around the fort in a succession of different hats so as to fool the Indians, 
they appropriate titles to suit the contract in hand. A typical sample: 
''Specialist in Demography," "Manager of Socio-Economic Systems," "Director of 
Advanced Concepts," "Consultant in Educational Systems." The new look which
8. 
they were supposed to bring is not only unfettered by doctrinaire restraints, 
as hoped; it is also lacking in orientation and devoid of an appropriate frame 
of reference. Thus, ignorance passes for objectivity, and banal generalization 
for total system comprehension. 
If anyone is surprised to learn that the emperor, for all his multi-
million-dollar wardrobe, goes naked, this is due to, the economic and political 
circumstances surrounding the growth and development of systems analysis in 
the public arena. You may recall the point I made earlier that these considera-
tions fostered the process but at the same time created caveats. Let me now 
explain what I meant. 
Systems business is booming; even the most conservative estimate can 
envision continued growth here and abroad. And no one with sufficient claim 
to systems expertness to preach or practice the technique would be so rash as 
to shoot down the goose that lays all the eggs, especially when they are golden! 
The community of problem-solvers seems more concerned with obtaining another 
contract than with improving the state of the art or of the nation. With no 
adequate review or evaluation of systems analyses performed, the objective is 
not to do better, but to do more. Government agencies sometimes try to ensure 
a worthwhile produc by hiring another expert to serve as consultant or moni-
tor, but this, from my observations, does not work. He is likely to be a 
member of the fraternity, and his loyalties lie with theirs. He shows great 
empathy with them; his "critique" harps on the difficulties of achieving the 
promises contained in the proposal. Underscoring the magnitude and complexity 
of the task, he recommends more generous allocation of funds for more systems 
studies. Conceding that the methodology may have shortcomings, he nonetheless 
urges us not to throw the baby out with the bath water, or, to return to the 
goose analogy, the egg with the eggshells! And this makes good sense economically,
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for, with the growing trend toward government by contract, there is no telling 
what side of the table the expert may occupy. Undersecretary of a government 
agency yesterday, director of an institute seeking grants today, adviser to 
contracting agencies tomorrow, and always a salesman in disguise, he testifies 
at Congressional hearings and delivers keynote addresses at meetings of all 
kinds of professional groups. Inviting his presence at the latter is strictly 
like putting a fox in a henhouse , for he invariably predicts great problems 
ahead in the particular field and promulgates the notion that nothing short 
of the powerful tools of his technology will be able to handle them. 
The phenomenon of the oversell is apparent throughout the process of.sys-
tems analysis, from proposal to final report. Self-perpetuation is the name 
of the game; its rules are simple: One for the money; two for the show. The 
winner gets the most follow-on contracts. 
And it is the political environment that keeps the game going. Systems - 
analysis is gaining popularity from county to Congress and represents a kind 
of Fandwagon on which many public officials ride for many reasons. Just as 
in some social circles, one's psychoanalysis is a status symbol, so now is 
systems analysis in government circles. It is well known that many federal 
agencies invite proposals for systems analysis at the very time when tight 
money is causing cutbacks in all other activity.. If the California experience 
proved nothing else, it showed that, regardless of their intrinsic worth, 
systems studies are a handy political tool. They can justify an ideological 
position by strategic inclusion or exclusion of pertinent data; they provide 
simplistic solutions to complex problems. Better than a blue-ribbon committee 
or a special commission,6 they convey the impression of high level concern 
for a politically-sensitive matter. The results are often their own best 
protection against critical public scrutiny, for they take the form of 
6 Elizabeth B. Drew, "On Going Oneself a Hotfoot: Government by Commission," 
The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 221, No. 14, May, 1968, pp 45-50.
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platitudes expressed in "dynamic programing models," designed to impress 
but not illuminate, commonplaces couched in jargon, and reams of undigested 
computer printouts, provided as evidence of work bUsily but not necessarily 
done. Protection serves the interests of both the contractor and the govern-
ment agency, for systems analysis involves a sizeable expenditure. No public 
official is so possessed of the death wish as to admit that the venture was 
anything less than successful. To insure this, the completed stidy is assigned 
to a handpicked task force that can be trusted to bury it decently. In most 
instances, copies of the final report are not available for scrutiny. In every 
case, the political environment provides a protective shroud; the undertaking 
and all parties to it must look good. 
Not surprisingly, the mixture of salesmanship and politics which dáminates 
the applications of systems analysis makes one wonder about the extent to which 
this is an intrinsic part of the technique. Perhaps it is not chance but design 
that produces "progress reports" too late to be enlightening. This, too, may 
be part of the technique. But, if so, then, in the final analysis, we may dis-
cover that the logic sounds better than it is and that the methodology works 
better on paper than in practice. The pervasive zeal for self-perpetuation 
practically guarantees stagnation in the state of the art. With little benefit 
or Feedback from earlier experience, the same level of sophistication remains, 
with the same shortcomings, the same deficiencies, the same old excuses. 
Methodological and conceptual mutations are needed in order to create a tool 
useful in social planning, but these cannot take place unless there are channels 
of inquiry and assessment free from public relations embellishments. 
There is an important role in the process of social accounting and plan-
fling to be played by professional persons, whether in the employ of government, 
industry, universities, or elsewhere. In every systems study, the close and
constant involvement of individuals expert in the relevant disciplines is 
absolutely essential. Since human and social values are at stake and must 
be safeguarded as old problem areas are subjected to new modes of treatment, 
there must be b ui lt into the process the active participation of competent 
behavioral scientists. To be sure, this requirement will probably offend that 
group's conception of itself and its role for, in their preoccupation with 
methodological chastity, its members have roosted on a high level of abstraction 
and concerned themselves with theory construction. Despite all the hazards 
involved, there is an urgent :eed for the responsible conduct, handling, and 
reporting of live research so that models of social systems will be adequate 
representations of the reality situation and not sktchy distortions produced 
by inappropriate experts. 
Every major problem facing urban society today is multifaceted in nature. 
Understanding calls for knowledge on many fronts. Economic, political, and 
social rationality must all contribute to developing a viable model. Highly 
desirable, indeed, would be a creative synthesis achieved through a genuine 
multidisciplined approach. It is interesting to speculate the extent to which 
systems analysis will be the means to and end of such a synthesis.
